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INTRODUCTION
Joseph L. Sax*

Reading through the articles in this Symposium is like
walking deep into a dense forest. The experience is exhilarating, but edged by a concern that the farther you go, the less
sure you are of where you are. The articles here reveal the
problem of cultural preservation in all its complexity and manysidedness. This is not one of those symposia where the authors
seek to outdo each other in self-condemnation for the wrongs
perpetrated by colonial invaders on hapless indigenous people.
Neither is it a lament for the assault on science by advocates of
modish multiculturalism. The essays here are serious efforts
to understand and to explore the implications of one important
strand of the contemporary interest in "communities" as a focus
for political, moral, and cultural life.
Several of the articles directly address fundamental issues
posed by concerns for cultural preservation. In his article for
this Symposium, Jeremy Waldron urges that there is a deep
tension between the cosmopolitan and communitarian accounts
of the good life, and that the latter, out of which arise the
currently popular claims for preservation, needs to provide
answers to some momentous questions.' Waldron suggests that
claims for cultural preservation build on the notion "that each
person needs to be a member of a particular cultural community" in order to flourish.2 Programs and policies to promote
and preserve traditional cultures follow. But, Waldron suggests, the assumption may not only be unproven; it may be
positively wrong. He offers the contrasting images of the
ultimate cosmopolitan, Salman Rushdie, a self-described
mongrel and hybrid, and the pure communitarians who call for
his execution. Perhaps, Waldron suggests,
the hybrid lifestyle of the true cosmopolitan is in fact
the only appropriate response to the modern world in
which we live .... a world formed by technology and
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trade, by economic, religious, and political imperialism
and their off-spring, mass migration and the dispersion
of cultural influences. In this context, to immerse
oneself in the traditional practices of, say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological
experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation
from what is actually going on in the world.3
Anticipating the argument that claims for cultural sovereignty do not call for such judgments, but only for being left
alone, Waldron observes that those who seek to protect
traditional communities often seek "special subsidization and
extraordinary provision by those who live in the real world
where cultures and practices are not so sealed off from one
another."'
Waldron's is not the only article to take a skeptical stance
toward the now popular claims of communitarianism. Indeed,
several of the articles here can be understood as a rich elaboration on the questions Waldron has so provocatively posed and
on his assertion about the nature of the modern world. On the
other hand, several of the articles are sympathetic to the claims
of indigenous peoples, and one at least provides a quite
different view of the inevitability of tension between modernity
and cultural preservation. Dean Suagee notes that increasing
reliance on what are called soft energy paths (using renewable
resources like sun and wind and conservation techniques like
insulation) can mitigate or avoid conflict with the needs of
traditional economies for such things as "habitat" for subsistence economic activities.5 Suagee's article calls attention to
one of the reasons that the claims for preservation have gained
ground of late. Our environmental failures undermine the old
confidence in science, progress, and modernity-the very things
that comprise the cosmopolitan outlook. The claim is that
traditional ways of life have something to teach the contemporary world.
Historical experience provides another angle of vision on
the issues and is the focus of a fascinating article by Nomi
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Stolzenberg and David Myers.6 They trace the decline of the
Jewish kehilah, a form of political organization in which
Jews lived as a separate community in the alien (and often
hostile) environs of a host nation. While acknowledging
functions reserved to the host sovereign, such as taxation
and military service, the kehilah incorporated a residual sort
of sovereignty that maintained and governed (through
sanctions like excommunication) a distinctive community of
Jews.7 What does the experience of the historic kehilah have
to say to advocates of autonomous communities in the
contemporary world?
Stolzenberg and Myers point out that as Jews became full
citizens, the rationale for the kehilah evaporated.8 Indeed,
the debate over the emancipation of the Jews in France
during the time of the French Revolution focused clearly on
the transformation that would take place. 9 To acquire the
rights of a citizen, individual rights, necessarily meant
dissolution of a Jewish community as a legal entity with
rights and powers over its people.'" The very existence of an
idea like the rights of every Frenchman was in tension with
the concept of a self-governing community with its own rights
and privileges." Stolzenberg and Myers conclude that
the protection of autonomous legal orders cannot fully
be achieved within the framework of a unitary national
system of law .... [To expect that such orders can be
maintained is] a pipe dream. The full protection of an
alternative legal culture can only be obtained at the
price of dismantling central political order, except in
cases, like that of the Amish, where the alternative
order is extremely marginal and insular. 2
In another of the articles in the Symposium, Carol Weisbrod
uses an unreported 1947 case from an Ohio county to suggest the
difficulties that can be presented even by the quintessentially
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insular and self-reliant Amish.13 The issue is shunning. A
member of a conservative Amish community used a car to get a
sick child to medical treatment, as a result of which he was
shunned, that is, avoided and boycotted. His own brother was told
to have no dealings with him and other members were forbidden
to help him with his harvest. His father was told to remove him
from the farm he was operating under lease, and when he hired
men to help him with his harvest they were banned. Though he
left the conservative group for a more liberal Amish group, he
apparently did not leave the physical community, and the 'shunning plainly harmed him both financially and psychologically. 4
The question raised by the case was whether the state should have
intervened in the affair to protect the shunned party. If the state
does so, it undermines the autonomy of the Amish community. The
court said the question before it was whether the continued
shunning denied the plaintiff the right to leave the church. He had
exited, but the church remained in a position to exercise power over
him. Presumably the church took the position that no mere
resignation ended its authority over the plaintiff. Whatever one's
response to the case, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
determining the point at which state intervention is appropriate
can be sticky. As one ups the ante in terms of church repression
of what "we" consider basic liberties, we are pressed back on the
question that Waldron poses: where do our basic loyalties
reside-with communitarianism, or with such cosmopolitan values
as civil liberties?
From shunning one can move quickly to polygamy, ritual
suicide, and child sacrifice. Carl Schneider adds an interesting
example in the context of a child custody battle. 5 One parent
belongs to a fundamentalist sect which dissociates itself from
everyone who does not follow its extremely strict precepts, such as
separation from all outside activities. 6 It teaches that all who do
not follow the sect's practices are "unclean." 7 Should the state
respect such practices, or ignore them when custody is in question?
These are not questions put to rest by invoking words like
autonomy and sovereignty.

13.
14.
15.
(1992).
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Several of the articles focus on what most people consider the
strongest case for recognition of separate, autonomous communities: the case of indigenous people. Marie Deveney offers the
example of a Canadian case where Cree Indians sought to
prevent a power company from building roads and airports and
damming rivers. 8 The Cree asserted that these actions would
destroy their distinctive culture, making it impossible to
continue subsistence activities such as hunting and fishing that
were central to their identity as Cree Indians. 9 A Canadian
court found that the Cree culture did not have enough "distinctiveness" left, noting that the Crees participated significantly
in modern culture, as illustrated by their clothes and modern
homes, telephones, and diets, including the consumption of
Kentucky Fried Chicken.2' Deveney makes an astute observation addressed to those who (like the Canadian judges) are
perhaps too quick to emphasize the dominant posture of the
modern world, and its elements, as pervasive everywhere, even
in the heart of traditional communities; and to those who are
too ready to draw conclusions about the decline or inauthenticity of traditional communities in our time. As Deveney puts
it, "[C]ultural insiders often perceive meaningful distinctiveness
and cultural persistence where outsiders see only assimilation,
and .. .cultural insiders often assign a different hierarchy of

values to elements of their cultures than do outsiders."2 '
One of the foci for the debate is the question of "authenticity."
It is suggested that one should be wary of allowing members
of the dominant culture to decide whether a traditional
community is "authentic" and thus worthy of efforts to
maintain or to restore it. What may seem inauthentic and
already destroyed beyond repair to "us," as outsiders, may
appear entirely different to members of a fried-chicken-eating
Indian tribe.
Peter Welsh of the Heard Museum offers another perspective sympathetic to native claims.' Welsh raises what might
be called the negative claims of community. That is, native
people are seen by others as a distinctive community, and

18.
Marie R. Deveney, Courts and CulturalDistinctiveness, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
867 (1992).
19.
Id. at 871.
20.
Id. at 872.
21.
Id. at 873.
22.
Peter H. Welsh, Repatriationand CulturalPreservation:Potent Objects, Potent
Pasts, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 837 (1992).
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often not in a positive way. "We" see Indians, and we have
views about them. In the crudest sense, they are views of
the sort purveyed by old-fashioned cowboy-and-Indian
movies. Today those stereotypes are fading, but serious
issues remain for institutions like museums. What do their
collections of aboriginal artifacts explicitly or implicitly say
about indigenous people? Claims for autonomy are in part
defensive -partly a search for equality, partly an effort to
come to terms with a history of conquest and subjugation,
and a continued status as among the poorest and leastpowerful citizens. There is an issue of getting control of one's
own (collective) life. As Welsh puts it, it is a question of
"principles that proclaim the right of communities to ...
control the manner in which their lives are interpreted."23
The newly emphasized positive self-identification of
Indians as Indians often plays itself out in a struggle over
possession and control of artifacts held in museums and in
collections. Welsh uses the idea of "potency" of objects to
illustrate the different perspectives of different communities,
and to suggest that-however one conceives the conditions of
the contemporary world-important questions about the
treatment of "potent" objects must be addressed. "The same
objects at the same time can be potent in different ways for
Calling something
people from different backgrounds.
scientifically significant is calling it potent."24 And so, of
course, is calling it sacred. When two different groups claim
the object, potent for each, a decision must be made as to
which claim will prevail. To see the problem from a perspective like Waldron's is to assume that the scientific (cosmopolitan) claim should prevail. But as Deveney's example of the
Cree Indian case nicely illustrates, this is the perspective of
the outsider. Even in the modern world, even in a culture
that is profoundly affected by interdependence and supranationalism, a vital cultural group with roots in traditional
life may still exist. It may feel very much a "human yearning
or need to belong" that is real and entitled "to exist and ...
to be protected from decay, assimilation, and desuetude."2 5

23.
24.
25.

Id. at 859.
Id. at 858.
Waldron, supra note 1, at 757, 759.
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Joseph Carens 26 presents an entirely different issue to the
case of indigenous peoples: to what extent should they be
allowed to preserve their minority culture at the expense of
the majority? In particular, he discusses the case of Fiji.
Contrary to the typical pattern of imperialism, the British
deliberately took steps to preserve and protect the native
Fijians' culture, including restricted alienation of land and
maintaining the power of the native Fijian chiefs. As part of
this protection, the British imported laborers from India to
work the plantations. Now, a century later, the Fijian
Indians constitute a slight majority of the Fijian population.
The native Fijians, although numerically a minority group,
control eighty-three percent of the land. The Fijian Indians
have, however, been much more successful economically than
the native Fijians. The two groups have little in common and
rarely interact. Fiji became a democracy after British rule
ended; however, several years ago, after the Fijian Indians
gained control of the government for the first time, a group
of native Fijians overthrew the government through a
bloodless coup. Today, Fiji has adopted a new constitution
which guarantees native Fijians a majority in Parliament
and fortifies the power of the native Fijian chiefly establishment. Carens, attempting to reconcile conflicting sympathies
for both groups, asks:
Can one criticize the coup but endorse institutions and
practices that contributed to the sense of ethnic identity
that lay behind the coup? Can one endorse an ideal of
equal citizenship and insist that Fijian Indians are morally
entitled to be treated as equal citizens, yet still defend the
of certain rights and privileges
constitutional entrenchment
27
Fijians?
native
for
These few snippets from the articles in the Symposium
should give some idea of how deep and tangled this forest of
cultural preservation is. As I noted at the beginning of this
Introduction, I doubt that those who enter this intellectual
thicket will find an obvious exit path labelled "The True Way."
But they may find, like most mind travellers, that the pleasure
is in the journey, not the destination.
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